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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to explain determinates of the choice and the pricing of 
various types of callable and non-callable bonds. We find that the popularity of 
different types of callable and non-callable bonds is significantly related to the 
economic environment. In addition, the popularity of claw back bonds appear to 
be driven by agency considerations, make whole bonds by the debt overhang 
problem, ordinary callable bonds by the need by banks to deal with interest rate 
changes and non-callable bonds by the need to raise funds as cheaply as 
possible. All else equal, firms pay a higher offer spread for the flexibility to call 
a claw back bond early via a new share offering whereas issuers of make whole 
bonds are rewarded with a lower offer spread for restricting calls to 
circumstances that does not expropriate bondholder wealth. 
 
Keywords: Callable bonds, Non-callable bonds, Claw back call provisions, whole 
make call provisions  
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In recent years many bond indenture agreements include two new 
provisions, the make whole and the claw back provision that refine the 
circumstances upon which a bond can be called prior to maturity. In this paper, 
we examine determinates and the pricing of make whole and claw back bonds 
as well as ordinary callable and non-callable bonds. 
The make whole call price represents the present value of all coupon and 
principal repayments. Specifically, the call price is determined by a discount 
rate set as the yield on a similar maturity Treasury bond plus a fixed spread. 
This implies that the firm has little incentive to refinance its debt due to a fall in 
the level of interest rates or a narrowing of the credit spread. Similarly, the claw 
back provision reduces the incentive to refinance in order to save on interest 
costs by allowing the firm to call debt only from the proceeds of an equity issue. 
However, claw back bond issuers are still able to gain financial advantage if the 
credit spread is inversely correlated with stock prices.  
To illustrate, examine the information presented for two claw back 
bonds in Table 1, Panel A. Bond A is a high credit quality five year bond. For a 
flat Treasury term structure of 3% and a 300 basis point credit spread, Bond A 
has an annual coupon and par yield of 6%. Meanwhile, Bond B is a low credit 
quality five year bond with a 700 basis point credit spread and so has an annual 
coupon and par yield of 10%. Comparing Panel B with Panel C, we note that a 
200 basis point decrease in the Treasury term structure has precisely the same 
price response as a 200 basis point tightening of the credit spread. Moreover, as 
Panel D illustrates, the credit spread for a given bond can improve due to a 
credit rating upgrade rather than a general tightening of credit spreads so that 
investors can obtain an increase in bond price due to credit events specific to the 
firm. Assuming that share prices are inversely correlated with credit spreads; a 
narrowing of the credit spread will be associated with a share price increase. 
Then the firm will gain financial advantage by issuing by selling cheap shares to 
call back expensive claw back bonds. 
 Table 1 also illustrates the traditional justification for ordinary callable 
bonds because shareholders will gain in Panel B if they are able to call the bond 
at par as the level of interest rate falls to 1%. Therefore, one possible reason 
why claw back bonds exist is to span the market by enabling firms to exploit 
their advantage in forecasting general credit conditions or firm specific credit 
quality improvements just as some firms can potentially take advantage of their 
ability to anticipate a fall in the level of interest rates by issuing ordinary 
callable bonds.  
 
<< Table 1 about here >> 
 
Of course, this motivation for issuing claw back bonds does require that 
firms must have some private information concerning credit conditions just as 
firms issuing ordinary callable bonds must have some special ability to forecast 
interest rates. Otherwise, what appears to be a bond contract term that benefits 
shareholders ex post, can well be anticipated by bondholders who expropriate 
them in the initial terms of the bond contract. Therefore we examine the pricing 
of callable and non-callable bonds to determine whether firms pay a premium 
for issuing a given type of bond relative to all other types. 
The literature concentrates on agency theoretic explanations for the use 
of the claw back and ordinary call provisions. Goyal et al. (1998) and Daniels 
(2009) find that small firms with lower ratings and modest profitability, 
precisely the sort of firms that experience more sever agency problems, favor 
claw back bonds.  Banko and Zhou (2010) find that the classic call option is 
used to resolve a combination of asymmetric information and underinvestment 
problems.  
Meanwhile, make whole bonds are designed such that they cannot be 
called to take advantage of a fall in interest rates, credit spreads or an 
improvement in credit rating as the call price is set relative to the current level 
on interest rates and a constant credit spread. Evidently, make whole callable 
bonds are meant to reassure bond investors that the bond will be called only for 
operational reasons, say to eliminate a debt overhang, and not to exploit an 
informational advantage. There is substantial empirical evidence in the literature 
that supports this view. Survey evidence in Mann and Powers (2003b) and 
Powers and Sarkar (2006) find that corporate executives believe that make-
whole call provisions offer tangible benefits to the firm in the form of increased 
financial flexibility. Nayar and Stock (2008) find that firms that issue make 
whole bonds actually obtain tangible benefits as they experience superior post 
issue stock returns and analysts forecast higher post issue growth for firms 
issuing make whole bonds. 
However, the agency theoretic explanations for claw back and ordinary 
callable bonds and the debt overhang explanation for make whole bonds are 
static in nature and do not explain the well documented time series variations in 
the popularity of different types of call provisions. Kalotay (2008) and Banko 
and Zhou (2010) observes that the portion of ordinary callable to all bond issues 
have been declining over the last 20 years and its popularity has shifted towards 
the below investment grade segment of the corporate bond market. In contrast, 
our more recent sample finds that callable bonds are becoming increasingly 
popular. Meanwhile Goyal et al. (1998) and Daniels (2009) document the 
increasing popularity of claw back bonds. Clearly, there are additional 
considerations that influence the popularity of the different types of callable 
bonds; a gap that we intend to address. Therefore, we develop a much larger set 
of hypothesis and test them in an attempt to explain why the popularity of 
different types of call provisions change.  
Among the highlights of our results is the discovery that the popularity of 
ordinary callable bonds is decreasing in the level and slope of the term structure 
and the credit spread whereas the popularity of non-callable bonds is increasing in 
the level and slope of the term structure, interest rate volatility and the credit 
spread. High credit quality firms prefer to float large issues of simple non-callable 
bonds with no restrictive or strong security features. Banks prefer ordinary callable 
bonds without restrictive features and without strong security. Make whole and 
claw back bonds contain restrictive covenants and have a high security level and 
are issued by smaller firms via private issue or by negotiation. Correcting for self-
selection bias, issuers of make whole bonds are rewarded with a discount relative 
to the offer spread of all other types of bonds for eliminating the possibility of 
calling the bond for financial advantage. Relative to make whole bonds, the offer 
spreads on all other types of bonds are higher with claw backs being the most and 
non-callable bonds being the less expensive.  
 
1. Reasons for different types of callable bonds 
We do not know why the popularity of different types of call provisions 
varies through time. Clearly, there is more to the dynamics of the callable bond 
market that we can, at present, explain. Below we explain our hypotheses 
concerning the issue characteristics of claw back, make whole, ordinary callable 
and non-callable bonds. Specifically, we group our hypothesis into five factors, 
the Economic Environment, Asymmetric Information, Funding Costs, Agency 
Costs and Debt Overhang. Table 2 provides a summary of our detailed 
hypothesis. Note that our hypothesis are not necessarily mutually exclusive so 
that a variable such as COMPANY SIZE primarily associated with Funding 
Costs for non-callable bonds can also be associated with Agency Costs for claw 
back bonds.  
 
<<Table 2 about here>> 
 
A. Economic Environment 
Changes in the economic environment can explain the time varying 
popularity of callable versus non-callable bonds because changes in the level, 
slope and volatility of the term structure and changes in the credit spread 
implies that the costs and benefits of each type of call provision will vary.  If 
interest rates mean revert then the a rise in interest rates suggest that ordinary 
callable bonds will become more popular because as interest rates later fall the 
bond can be called to benefit the firm’s shareholders.  
Similarly, Estrella and Mishkin (1997) find that increases in the slope of 
the term structure are associated with increases in anticipated inflation while 
Estrella and Mishkin (1998) and Ang et al. (2006) also find that decreases in the 
slope of the term structure foreshadows a fall in interest rates. This suggests that 
an increase in the slope of the term structure can foreshadow a rise in interest 
rates. Therefore as the slope of the term structure rises, ordinary callable bonds 
issues will be less popular as fewer firms expect to benefit by calling them.  
As illustrated in Table 1, claw back and ordinary callable bonds can 
benefit from a narrowing of the credit spread. Van Horne (2001) suggests that 
there is a credit cycle that is coincident with the economic cycle. This implies 
that like interest rates, the credit spread can mean revert so that as the credit 
spread increases more callable bonds are issued as issuers hope to benefit by 
calling them later once the credit spread narrows. We expect this positive 
association between callable bonds and the credit spread to be strongest for claw 
back bonds as the claw back bond is specifically designed to benefit from a 
narrowing of the credit spread.  
However, bondholders can anticipate any and all of the above events and 
negate the present value of expected shareholder benefits by charging a higher 
initial coupon rate and call premium. Indeed, bondholders can require a call risk 
premium in response to say, a rise in interest rates, so that firms issue cheaper 
non-callable bonds instead. Therefore a rise in the level of interest rates, an 
increase in the slope of the term structure and an increase in the credit spread 
could be directly or inversely related to more issues of callable bonds. In any 
event, non-callable bonds are a close substitute for callable bonds so if we 
observe say a direct relation between the level of interest rates and ordinary 
callable bonds we would then expect to see an inverse relation between interest 
rates and the popularity of non-callable bonds.  
Shelf registered bonds are bonds that can be issued quickly in response 
to market events as most of the detailed information requirements are already 
filed with regulatory authorities. If firms do time the issue of ordinary callable 
and claw back bonds in response to changes in the term structure and/or credit 
spread then their ability to do so will be enhanced by employing shelf registered 
bonds. Therefore, if issuers try to time the issue of ordinary callable and claw 
back bonds they are likely to be shelf registered bonds. Conversely, there 
appears to be no rationale why issuers would attempt to time the issue of non-
callable bonds so we expect that non-callable bonds are unlikely to be shelf 
registered bonds. 
In contrast, make whole bonds are specifically designed to eliminate any 
financial advantage for calling in response to a change in the level, slope or 
credit spread. Therefore, a rise in any of these three factors will discourage new 
issues of make whole bonds as it will be more costly to exercise the call 
provision. Similarly, the popularity of callable bonds should be inversely related 
to interest rate volatility. All else equal, a rise in interest rate volatility implies 
an increase in call risk for bondholders without any obvious benefit for 
shareholders. Therefore, as interest rate volatility rises all types of callable 
bonds are discouraged as call risk premiums rise whereas non-callable bonds 
are encouraged as they are likely to be the cheaper choice. 
 
 
B. Asymmetric information 
A review of the factors related to a changing economic environment 
reveals that some of the signs of economic factors are ambiguous. We can 
obtain more definitive hypotheses however, once we recognize that certain 
types of firms have a special advantage in processing economic information. 
Specifically financial firms that perform the banking function, that is borrowing 
money at low rates of interest, usually at short terms, and then lending this 
money at higher, often at fixed interest rates, for longer terms, are vitally 
concerned with changes in the interest rate environment. If these types of firms 
develop special expertise in forecasting interest rates, then they can, on average, 
be able to derive economic benefits from issuing ordinary callable bonds. 
Therefore, we expect that banks are more likely to issue ordinary callable bonds 
than firms in other industries. Alternatively, banks can issue ordinary callable 
bonds as interest rate risk is of vital concern and so issue callable bonds to 
ensure they can manage the spread between lending and borrowing rates. 
As is illustrated in Table 1, Panel D, low credit quality firms are more 
likely to benefit from claw back bonds as the credit spread can narrow due to a 
credit rating improvement as well as the general tightening of credit spreads. 
Moreover, small firms can have asymmetric information concerning the firm’s 
future earnings prospects. It is possible that they can anticipate a credit rating 
improvement. Therefore low rated, small firms are more likely to issue claw 
back bonds.  
 
 
C. Funding costs 
While the recent literature concentrates on callable bonds, it does not 
discuss the reasons why non-callable bonds are issued. As a first step towards 
understanding why firms would issue non-callable bonds, we propose that the 
driving force is the need to obtain funding at a minimal cost. Firms can 
minimize the cost of debt by enhancing the liquidity of its bonds. Therefore, we 
expect that non-callable bonds are the simplest bonds that are easiest to value 
and trade.  
Consequently, it is unlikely that non-callable bonds would contain 
restrictive covenants and high security features that can impede simple 
valuation. To reduce liquidity premiums, it is likely that straight bonds would be 
issued in larger amounts. It is more likely that large, high credit quality, 
profitable firms would be in a privileged position to take advantage of the non-
callable bond market by being able to float large issues of simple, low security 
bonds. In turn, this suggest that if large, high credit quality, profitable firms who 
have good access to capital issue non-callable bonds then non-callable bonds 
are unlike to resort to less liquid private issues. Large firms are more likely to 
need fairly continuous access to the bond market so non-callable bonds are 
more likely to employ term notes. Large, high credit quality, profitable firms 
issuing simple bond contracts will likely find that issuing the bonds via 
competitive bids rather than negotiated offers the cheaper option because simple 
bond contacts leave fewer topics for negotiation and well received competitive 
bids can reduce the offer spread.  
 
 D. Agency Costs 
It is well noted in the literature that small, modestly profitable, low 
credit rating firms have restrictive access to capital and suffer from agency 
problems. According to Goyal et al. (1998) and Daniels (2009), claw back 
bonds can alleviate some agency problems. Therefore, we expect that small, low 
profit and low credit rating firms will favor claw back bonds that are issued 
privately. Investors in bonds of small, low profit and low credit rating firms will 
likely require higher security and restrictive covenants to protect their 
investment so we expect that claw back bond will likely contain restrictive and 
high security covenants. Since this suggests the bond contract is complex, the 
initial issue is likely to be sold via negotiation rather than competitive bid.  
 
E. Debt overhang 
Mann and Powers (2003b) and Powers and Sarkar (2006) suggests that 
make whole bonds are used by firms that desire financial flexibility for 
operational reasons such as relieving the debt overhang problem caused by 
restrictive covenants. Therefore, it is likely that make whole bonds contain 
restrictive covenants and high security. This means the bond contract will be 
complex requiring negotiation with investors so the bond is likely to be issued 
via negotiation rather than competitive bids.  
 
 
 
2. Data selection 
We use the Mergent® Inc’s Fixed Investment Securities Database FISD. 
The FISD consists of detailed cross sectional information on issue 
characteristics of all bonds that the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners had on their books as of January 1, 1995, and all bonds that they 
bought up to and including May 27, 2008. Each of the approximately 100,000 
bond issues is identified by the ISIN number and includes information on the 
maturity date, offering date, rating date, rating, rating type, offering amount, 
industry code and type of call provision.  
From the FISD, we select all bonds that were issued on or after January 
1, 1995 because prior to that date the NAIC had to backdate old issues in order 
to add them to the database. It is possible that bonds that have since matured 
prior to January 1, 1995 were not included so use of these backdated bonds may 
introduce some unknown survivorship bias. We select all bonds that belong to 
the industrial, financial, and utility industries while we eliminate Treasury 
bonds. Therefore our sample contains corporate bonds only. We select only 
fixed coupon bonds as we wish to concentrate on the straightforward choice 
among callable and non-callable bonds. On examining these corporate bonds for 
rating type we find that Duff and Phelps do not rate many bonds within each 
rating category. Moreover, virtually all bonds rated by Duff and Phelps are also 
rated by one of the other mainstream rating agencies, so we decide to neglect 
Duff and Phelps ratings. However, we consider all Standard and Poor’s, 
Moodys and Fitch rated bonds because they rate a large number of bonds in all 
industry categories.
1
 We only keep bonds with a rating date within one year of 
the offering date to ensure that the bond under study has the same rating it had 
on the date it was offered.  To report the characteristics of the sample by rating 
we convert Standard and Poors, Moodys and Fitch letter ratings into numerical 
equivalents from 21 (AAA) to 1 (C or D).
2
 
From this initial selection of bonds we select four sub samples, the claw 
back, make whole, ordinary callable and straight bond sub samples. The claw back 
sub sample consists of bonds that contain a claw back provision but does not 
contain any other type of optionality such as a make whole, ordinary call, put 
provision and so on.  Similarly, the make whole and ordinary callable bonds have 
make whole and ordinary call provisions respectively but do not contain any other 
type of optionality. Finally, non-callable bonds are bonds that do not contain a 
claw back, make whole or ordinary call provision or any other type of optionality. 
This helps ensure that we are dealing with “pure types” so that we are clearly 
focused on the choice amongst the various types of callable and non-callable 
bonds.  
These selection procedures leave a total sample of 10,028 bonds consisting 
of 979 claw back, 3,205 make whole, 2,816 ordinary callable bonds and 3,028 
straight bonds. Table 3 reports the details of the make whole, claw back and 
otherwise callable sub samples.   
                                                          
1
 We neglect bonds that were not rated as only very few bonds, less than 20, have no rating by 
one of the three rating agencies, and it is not clear how these bonds can be included in later 
regressions where the credit ranking appears as a key independent variable. 
2
 All rating agencies have an almost identical rating system with eight broad rating categories, 
six of which are sub divided into three shades of ratings. At the lower end there appears to be a 
minor deviation where Standard and Poors has one lower rating D and Fitch has two additional 
lower ratings of DD and DDD than Moodys so that in total Moodys has 21, Standard and Poors 22 
and Fitch 24 ratings. However this deviation is minor as very few bonds have a rating of D, DD or 
DDD within one year of issue so we simply assign the same numerical rating of one to Moodys’ 
rating of C, Standard and Poors’ ratings of C and D, and Fitch’s ratings of C, D, DD and DDD. 
 <<Table 3>> 
 
Table 3 reveals three notable characteristics of our sample of callable and 
non-callable bonds. First, examining the sub samples of bonds by industry, we note 
that while make whole bonds are popular in all industries, claw back bonds are 
popular in the industrial category and ordinary callable bonds are popular in the 
financial industry. Second, ordinary callable and straight bonds have higher ratings 
than make whole and claw back bonds in all industries. Specifically, make whole 
bonds tend to be rated one notch lower than ordinary callable bonds and claw back 
bonds at least three notches or more lower than ordinary callable bonds. Clearly, 
the low ratings of claw back bonds noted by Goyal et al. (1998) and Daniels (2009) 
are replicated in our sample. Third, we note that in all industries, non-callable 
bonds tend to have much shorter scheduled maturities than their callable bond 
counterparts. Since the actual maturity of callable bonds is likely to be shorter than 
the scheduled maturity, one should be cautious in drawing conclusions about 
differences in scheduled maturity. Nevertheless, it is notable that ordinary callable 
bonds and make whole bonds have a much longer average maturity than claw back 
provision bonds. Bali and Skinner (2006) note that the average maturity of 
corporate bonds typically declines with credit rating. Evidently, much of this 
difference in average maturity is accounted for by the differences in average credit 
rating since as noted above; the credit rating of claw back bonds is at least three 
notches lower than the credit rating of ordinary callable bonds.  
Banko and Zhou (2010) and Crabbe and Helwege (1994) amongst others 
note that the use of call provisions vary through time. To examine the trend in the 
use of non-callable and various types of callable bonds we plot the portion of 
bonds of each type relative to all types of bonds by offering year in Figure 1. Note 
that the portions are calculated as the number of bonds of a particular “pure” type 
relative to the total number of “pure” straight, claw back, make whole and ordinary 
callable bonds offered in a given year Moreover, we end the figure in 2007 as our 
2008 information ends part way through the year and so is not directly comparable 
with the earlier full years. 
 
<<Figure 1 about here>> 
 
Figure 1 shows that starting from a dominate position, the number of 
“pure” new issue non-callable bonds relative to the sum of all “pure” non-calable, 
claw back, make whole and ordinary callable new bond issues declines almost 
continuously throughout the January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2007 period. From 
modest beginnings, make whole and ordinary callable bonds become popular 
reaching 30 to 50% of all bonds towards the latter half of the sample period. 
Meanwhile, claw back bonds remain a rather small, albeit steady segment of the 
new issue market. Clearly, the new issue market exhibits variations in the 
popularity in the types of bonds issued through time, a phenomenon that this paper 
seeks to shed light upon. 
 
4. Model development 
The FISD contains variables that indicate the presence of the full range 
of bond covenants including protective and restrictive bond features and the 
security level. There are also indicator variables for exchange listing and for 
private placement of the bond issue. As bond market and firm level data is not 
available from the FISD we employ three additional sources of information. 
Treasury market information is collected from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York and other bond market information is collected from DataStream. 
We also collect firm level information from Bloomberg. The Bloomberg 
database contains financial statement information that can be linked to the FISD 
bond information via the nine-digit CUSIP numbers.
3
 
We collect the one and ten year constant maturity Treasury interest rates 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Table H6. We proxy the level of 
the term structure as the one year rate and the slope of the term structure as the 
difference between the ten year and one year rates. We collect at the money 5 
year cap rates and the yield on the Merrill Lynch high yield index from 
DataStream. At the money caps represent the implied volatility from five year 
interest rate caps and are our proxy for interest rate volatility. The difference 
between the yield on the Merrill Lynch high yield index and the one year 
Treasury rate is our proxy for the credit spread on the bond market. 
We wish to determine the variables that influence the popularity and the 
pricing of claw back, make whole, ordinary callable and straight bonds. As we 
discuss in section 3, firms will self-select bonds of a given type based on the 
economic environment, asymmetric information and funding requirements so 
we must adjust our inquiry for self-selection bias. Heckman (1979) provides the 
methodology for dealing with self-selection bias by treating the problem as a 
case of an omitted variable. We follow Heckman’s (1979) two stage least 
                                                          
3
 In performing the match of the Bloomberg data with the FISD database we gratefully 
acknowledge expert help from the staff of Bloomberg data. All of the subsequent matches made by 
CUSIPS were double checked by matching company names. 
squares procedure by first running a probit selection equation to extract the 
inverse mills ratio and then use the mills ratio as an independent variable in an 
OLS valuation regression. The inverse mills ratio then serves as a correction for 
self-selection as it measures the unexplained factors that led to the selection of a 
given bond type. This omitted variable is then added to the pricing equation to 
then measures the influence self-selection has on bond pricing. These 
procedures have become increasingly popular in the literature and good 
examples can be found in Kwan and Carleton (2010) and Daniels et al. (2009). 
Our selection equation investigates determinates of the popularity of 
different bond types and the pricing equation, corrected for self-selection bias, 
investigates determinates of the pricing of different bond types. The selection 
equation is 
Where i refers to a given bond where BT = 1 if the bond is on type j, 
being zero otherwise. Therefore there are 4 probit models where if say j =1 and 
BT = 1, i is a claw back bond, zero otherwise and again another probit model 
where if j = 2 and BT =1, i is a make whole bond, zero otherwise and so on for 
the additional probit regressions for ordinary callable and non-callable bonds. 
All variables are defined in Table 4 and are designed to test out hypotheses 
discussed in Section 3 and summarized in Table 2. Note there are two additional 
control variables in (1) because a critical variable, credit rating, is an imperfect 
proxy for the credit worthiness of the company issuing the bond. Therefore we 
(1)             )QRDRROARATINGRESTRICTSECURITYPRIVATE 
ECOMPETITIVNOTE TERMAMOUNTSIZE COMPANYBANKSHELF
SPREAD CREDIT VOLATILITYSLOPE LEVELConstant(F)1BT(P
ittttttt
tttiit
iiiiji
include the company’s total debt ratio TD and quick ratio QR to measure the 
total debt burden and liquidity of the firm that issued the bond. 
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We estimate four versions of the above selection equation, one each for 
make whole, claw back, ordinary callable and non-callable bonds, using 
maximum likelihood probit regressions for the full sample of 10,028 
observations. The standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. From 
each of the above probit regressions we extract the inverse mills ratio.  
The pricing equation contains the variables that we expect to determine 
the offer spread.  
 
Where (Yi-Ym)i is the offer spread, that is the  difference between the 
offering yield for a given bond i and the yield on corresponding maturity m 
Treasury bond, MillSCB, MillSMW, MillSOC and MillSNC, are the estimated 
inverse mills ratios from (1) for the claw back, make whole, ordinary callable 
and non-callable bond probit regressions and all other variables are as 
previously defined. Additionally, we include two industry dummy variables, 
FINANCIAL and UTILITY because the systematic risk of the financial, utility 
(2)                                                      )MILLSNCMILLSOCMILLSMW
MILLSCBSLOPE QRDRROASIZE COMPANY
UTILITYFINANCIALECOMPETITIVPRIVATE
SHELF  RATINGRESTRICTSECURITY Constant)YY(
ittt
tittti
iitt
ttttmi
and industrial company sectors can be different and so influence the offer 
spread. Also, we exclude the LEVEL and CAP5Y because of high collinearity 
problems.
4
  
 
5. Empirical results 
Table 5 reports the result of the selection equation (1) and is meant to 
shed light on what determines the characteristics and the type of a bond a firm 
will issue.  Note that overall, all probit regressions seem to explain the data 
reasonably well with a minimum R-square of 35%. Moreover, of the 35 signed 
hypothesis summarized in Table 2, 29 of them are of the correct sign and 
significant. Only in one instance, SHELF for claw back bonds are the 
coefficients of the incorrect sign and significant.  
 
<< Table 5 about here>> 
 
A. Economic Environment 
The first five variables, from LEVEL to SHELF, examine the influence 
of the economic environment on bond issue choice. Clearly, the higher the 
current (LEVEL) and anticipated (SLOPE) interest rate, the more likely non-
callable bonds are issued in preference to ordinary callable bonds. This suggests 
that bond investors anticipate mean reversion so that higher rates of current and 
futures interest rates imply that, eventually, the bonds will be called to the 
                                                          
4
 LEVEL, SLOPE and CAP5Y are all highly correlation with each other, almost 0.9 in all cases. 
Including two or more of these variables in (2) result in classic collinearity problems. 
financial advantage of the firm. Evidently, firms are discouraged from issuing 
callable bonds as call risk premiums rise in anticipation of future lower rates 
and so issue non-callable bonds instead. Similarly, as volatility rises, the call 
option embedded in callable bonds becomes more expensive making non-
callable bonds the more attractive funding option. Corroborating evidence is 
found by examining the popularity of make whole bonds. As these bonds are 
designed to make sure shareholders will not benefit from calling in response to 
fall in interest rates we observe that a rise in the LEVEL, SLOPE and 
VOLATILITY reduces the likelihood that a make whole bond will be issued.  
As we expect, increases in the CREDIT SPREAD encourages the issue 
of claw back bonds but perversely discourages the issue of ordinary callable 
bonds. The reason for this perplexing result can be found by re-examining Table 
4. Note that claw back bonds are below investment grade whereas ordinary 
callable bonds are investment grade. As illustrated in Table 1, the price of lower 
grade bonds have more room for improvement in response to a change in the 
credit rating than higher rated bonds so the influence of the credit spreads is 
strongly felt for below investment grade claw back bonds. Given the investment 
grade of ordinary callable bonds however, there is less room for improvements 
in the price through changes in the credit rating. Moreover, due to mean 
reversion, if there is a higher likelihood of call as the credit spread widens, firms 
can be discouraged to issue ordinary callable bonds as bond investors can be 
adding a higher call risk premium. In turn, this explains the related positive 
CREDIT SPREAD coefficient for non-callable bonds. If non-callable bonds are 
close substitutes for ordinary callable bonds, then as the CREDIT SPREAD 
widens, non-callable bonds become more popular as callable bonds become less 
popular.   
Finally, we note that issuers of ordinary callable bonds do use shelf 
registered bonds whereas issuers of non-callable bonds do not. This provides 
evidence that issuers of ordinary callable bonds are timing the issue of these 
bonds, waiting for the “right” economic environment to issue these bonds. It is 
interesting that issuers of non-callable bonds do not appear to time their issues 
possibly because high credit quality firms always need to fund their operations 
and for them, non-callable bonds always provide a viable alternative 
irrespective of the economic environment. Unexpectedly, claw back bonds do 
not use shelf-registration possibly because it is hard to anticipate in advance the 
restrictive covenants private investors will require. 
 
B. Asymmetric information 
The variables BANK and COMPANY SIZE predominately proxy for 
the effect of asymmetric information. In section 3 we suggest that banks can 
develop an informational advantage in processing interest rate information and 
so would favor issuing ordinary callable bonds either because they can expect to 
achieve financial advantage by selling undervalued call options embedded in 
ordinary callable bonds or to manage interest rate risk. Clearly, Table 5 provides 
strong support as the Bank coefficient is positive and highly significant for 
ordinary callable bonds. Moreover, we suggest that small firms can have an 
information advantage concerning the likelihood of credit rating improvements 
and so would favor issuing claw back bonds. Again we observe strong support 
because the likelihood of issuing a claw back bond inversely related to firm 
size. 
 
C. Funding costs 
We expect that the next three variables, AMOUNT, TERM NOTE, and 
COMPETITIVE will be directly associated with non-callable bonds if the 
primary purpose of non-callable bonds is to raise funds cheaply. Table 5 reports 
that all of these coefficients are positive, and two of them, AMOUNT and 
TERM NOTE are significant. Five other variables, PRIVATE, RATING, ROA, 
SECURITY and RESTRICT, are all highly significant and have the signs that 
we expect. Taken together, these variables say that highly rated, profitable firms 
are likely to regularly float large issues of simple non-callable bonds to the 
public. This implies that non-callable bonds are issued by firms wishing to 
minimize funding costs. 
 
D. Agency Costs/Debt Overhang 
Firms that suffer most from agency costs are expected to be low rated, 
modestly profitable firms that favor issuing bonds privately. Table 6 shows that 
low rated firms (RATING) tend to issue claw back bonds privately (PRIVATE) 
so we have clear evidence that claw back bonds can be used to deal with agency 
costs. Further evidence is provided by the secondary characteristics of claw 
back issues. Claw backs are issued by relatively small firms (COMPANY SIZE) 
who are thought to be prone to agency problems. To protect themselves from 
agency problems, bondholders insist on restrictive covenants (RESTRICT) and 
high security (SECURITY) and both of these variable are significantly 
associated with claw back bonds.  
Table 6 provides strong evidence that make whole bonds are meant to 
provide flexibility in dealing with the debt overhang problem. RESTRICT and 
SECURITY proxy for bond covenants that can later prove to be onerous by 
inhibiting the operations (RESTRICT) or the refinancing (SECURITY) of the 
firm. Both coefficients are positive and highly significant meaning that make 
whole bonds are likely to contain restrictive covenants and a high level of 
security. This suggests that make whole bonds can be replaced via call with a 
new bond issue with less restrictive covenants without raising concerns from 
bond investors that they will lose out financially during the call. 
 
E. Pricing 
Table 6 reports the result of the pricing equation (2) and is meant to shed 
light on what determines the offer spread for corporate bonds.  A special feature 
of (2) is the inverse mill ratio coefficients which shed light on the relative price 
paid by issuers for various types of bonds. All coefficients are statistically 
significant and all of these have reasonable signs. Specifically, the offer spread 
decreases in SECURITY, restrictive covenants (RESTRICT) and RATING. 
Issue processes meant to reduce the cost of funds such as using a shelf 
prospectus (SHELF) and employing a competitive bid (COMPETITIVE) 
reduces the offer spread whereas selling to private investors (PRIVATE) 
increases the offer spread. FINANCE companies pay a higher and utilities 
(UTILITY) a lower offer spread than industrial firms. Meanwhile, larger firms 
(COMPANY SIZE) with higher return on assets (ROA) and liquidity (QR) pay 
a lower offer spread whereas firms with higher debt burdens (DR) pay a higher 
offer spread. As the SLOPE of the term structure rises, possibly foreshadowing 
higher rates of interest, offer spreads increase. 
Importantly, the inverse mills ratios are all statistically significant. For 
claw backs, the positive coefficient means that issuers of claw backs must pay a 
premium for the ability to call bonds should credit conditions improve. This 
finding confirms Daniels et al. (2009) who also find a positive inverse mills 
ratio for claw back bonds. Interestingly, we find that issuers of make whole 
bonds are rewarded with lower credit spreads. This finding corroborates Nayar 
and Stock (2008) who find that firms that issue make whole bonds enjoy an 
initial positive stock price reactions followed up by long run superior 
performance. Evidently, all investors find that make whole bonds are attractive 
contracts as they preserve financial flexibility without confounding bond 
investors with call risk. Daniels et al. (2009) find that firms pay a higher offer 
spread for issuing ordinary callable bonds just as we do and that other than 
make whole bonds, the cheapest bond to issue are non-callable bonds. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
Overall we find that factors related to the Economic Environment, 
Asymmetric Information, Funding Cost, Agency Theory and the Debt Overhang 
problem can explain the popularity of claw back, make whole, ordinary callable 
and non-callable bonds. We find that indeed the popularity of callable versus 
non-callable bonds is influenced by changes in the economic environment. 
Increases and forecast increases in interest rates and increases in interest rate 
volatility discourage callable and encourage the issue of non-callable bonds 
possibly because call risk premiums rise making non-callable bonds the cheaper 
funding choice.  
We also note that firms that can have a special ability to process 
particular types of economic information do issue bonds that appear able to 
exploit this information. Banks are vitally interested in changes in interest rates 
and so are likely to issue interest rate sensitive ordinary callable bonds. Two 
possible reasons why the popularity of claw back bonds increase in the credit 
spread is because high credit spreads may mean revert and claw back bonds are 
issued by small, low rated firms who have private information concerning their 
credit upgrade prospects. 
Low funding costs seem to be the driving force behind issues of non-
callable bonds. Non-callable bond contracts are simple contracts without 
restrictive covenants and high security levels. They are issued in large amounts 
by high credit quality firms to the public. These measures can encourage the 
secondary trading thereby lowering liquidity premiums.  
We also find support for existing explanations of callable bonds. Clearly 
at least part of the demand for claw back and make whole bonds are caused by 
agency theoretic considerations. Claw backs are issued privately by small, low 
credit quality firms, just the sort of firm where agency problems are most sever. 
Moreover, claw back contracts typically include restrictions and high security 
levels, just the sort of clauses we expect investors to demand to protect 
themselves from agency conflicts. Finally, make whole bonds appear to be 
popular with firms that need financial flexibility to overcome a possible debt 
overhang problem should existing restrictive covenants later prove to be 
onerous.   
Firms issuing make whole bonds are rewarded by investors for 
eliminating the possibility of calling for financial advantage because once we 
control for self-selection bias we find that the offer spread is lower than the 
offer spread for other types of bonds. Meanwhile firms issuing claw backs and 
ordinary callable bonds must pay for the privilege as the offer spread is high 
than the offer spread of other types of bonds. Other than make whole bonds, the 
cheapest bond to issue are non-callable bonds. 
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Table 1. 
This table illustrates that corporate bond prices can respond to general credit spread 
improvements and credit quality upgrades in the same way as interest rate decreases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel A: Initial conditions 
Bond A B 
Coupon 6% 10% 
Maturity 5 5 
Yield 6% 10% 
Treasury 3% 3% 
Credit Spread 3% 7% 
Price $100 $100 
 Panel B: Interest Rate Shift 
Bond A B 
Coupon 6 10 
Maturity 5 5 
Yield 4% 8% 
Treasury 1% 1% 
Credit Spread 3% 7% 
Price $108.90 $107.99 
 Panel C: Credit Spread Shift 
Bond A B 
Coupon 6 10 
Maturity 5 5 
Yield 4% 8% 
Treasury 3% 3% 
Credit Spread 1% 5% 
Price $108.90 $107.99 
 Panel D: Credit Rating Shift 
Bond  AAA BBB 
Coupon 6 10 
Maturity 5 5 
Yield 4% 7% 
Treasury 3% 3% 
Credit Spread 1% 4% 
Price $108.90 $112.30 
Table 2. The hypothesized relations between bond issue characteristics and 
issues of claw back, make whole, ordinary callable and straight bond 
 
Factors/Variables Claw back Make 
whole 
Ordinary callable Non-callable 
Economic 
Environment 
    
LEVEL N/A Negative Positive/Negative Negative/Positive 
SLOPE N/A Negative Positive/Negative Negative/Positive 
VOLATILITY N/A Negative Negative Positive 
CREDIT SPREAD Positive/Negative Negative Positive/Negative Negative/Positive 
SHELF Positive N/A Positive Negative 
Asymmetric 
Information     
BANK N/A N/A Positive N/A 
COMPANY SIZE Negative N/A N/A N/A 
Funding Costs     
RESTRICTIVE N/A N/A N/A Negative 
SECURITY N/A N/A N/A Negative 
AMOUNT N/A N/A N/A Positive 
COMPANY SIZE  N/A N/A N/A Positive 
PROFITABILITY N/A N/A N/A Positive 
RATING N/A N/A N/A Positive 
PRIVATE N/A N/A N/A Negative 
TERM NOTE N/A N/A N/A Positive 
COMPETITIVE N/A N/A N/A Positive 
Agency/Debt 
Overhang     
COMPANY SIZE Negative N/A N/A N/A 
ROA Negative N/A N/A N/A 
PRIVATE Positive N/A N/A N/A 
RATING Negative N/A N/A N/A 
SECURITY Positive Positive N/A N/A 
RESTRICT Positive Positive N/A N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Sample Characteristics 
This table reports the number of bond issues by industry, type and rating during the period January 1, 1995 to May 8, 2008. 
 Industrial Financial Utility All 
Grade Claw 
Back 
Make 
Whole 
Ordinary 
Call 
Non-
Callable 
Sub 
Total 
Claw 
Back 
Make 
Whole 
Ordinary 
Call 
Non-
Callable 
Sub 
Total 
Claw 
Back 
Make 
Whole 
Ordinary 
Call 
Non-
Callable 
Sub 
Total 
Grand 
Total 
AAA 0 12 167 81 260 0 3 105 79 187 0 14 12 23 49 496 
AA+ 0 1 0 14 15 0 3 24 40 67 0 4 0 0 4 86 
AA 0 42 5 70 117 0 13 265 16 294 0 8 0 2 10 421 
AA- 0 58 18 101 177 0 24 119 27 170 0 47 3 27 77 424 
A+ 0 135 5 128 268 0 50 32 281 363 0 56 6 33 95 726 
A 0 199 247 160 606 0 50 767 79 896 0 120 5 78 203 1705 
A- 0 168 4 237 409 0 72 183 259 514 0 102 0 77 179 1102 
BBB+ 0 269 3 226 498 0 95 143 60 298 0 185 3 74 262 1058 
BBB 0 357 6 211 574 0 182 247 208 637 0 170 4 50 224 1435 
BBB- 2 236 4 103 345 0 142 177 19 338 0 98 2 26 126 809 
BB+ 20 106 9 67 202 2 9 37 7 55 0 24 0 5 29 286 
BB 42 50 12 45 149 4 5 22 2 33 4 15 0 3 22 204 
BB- 88 26 24 31 169 5 0 2 4 11 1 12 0 4 17 197 
B+ 181 10 34 28 253 14 0 9 6 29 9 6 1 6 22 304 
B 228 8 48 15 299 7 0 9 1 17 10 3 1 2 16 332 
B- 280 8 33 8 329 2 3 4 0 9 11 1 0 2 14 352 
CCC+ 46 3 10 2 61 3 0 1 0 4 1 0 0 1 2 67 
CCC 13 1 2 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 19 
CCC- 3 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
CC 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 903 1689 633 1527 4752 37 651 2146 1088 3922 39 865 37 413 1354 10028 
Rating B BBB+ A- A- BBB B+ BBB+ A A A- B BBB+ A+ A- BBB+ BBB+ 
Maturity 8.97 13.58 14.04 9.32 11.40 8.66 10.63 10.78 4.59 9.02 9.80 14.34 21.28 11.60 13.57 10.76 
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Table 4. Variables and Definitions 
Variable  Definition 
OFFER SPREAD Offer yield less yield on comparable maturity Treasury bond  
                               Economic Environment 
LEVEL The one year Treasury yield 
SLOPE The difference between the 10-year and one year Treasury interest rates 
VOLATILITY Interest rate volatility as measured by five year at the money caps. 
CREDIT SPREAD The credit spread as measured by the difference between the average yield on the 
Merrill Lynch high yield index and the one year Treasury yield. 
SHELF A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the bond is a shelf registered bond 
according to rule 415, 0 otherwise 
 Asymmetric Information 
BANK A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the company issuing the bond was a 
bank, a finance company or a savings and loan company, 0 otherwise 
COMPANY SIZE The log of the issuing company’s assets 
 Funding Cost 
AMOUNT The amount of a given bond issue. 
TERM NOTE A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the bond is a medium term note, 0 
otherwise 
COMPETITIVE A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the bond issue sale was competitive or 
exchange offered, 0 otherwise 
 Agency/Debt Overhang 
PRIVATE A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the bond is a private placement issue 
according to rule 144a, 0 otherwise 
RATING A 21 point rating scale where AAA is 21, AA+ is 20 and so on until CCC- is 3, CC is 2 
and C/D is 1. 
ROA The return on assets of the issuing company 
SECURITY Coded from 1 to 7 in increasing order of security. Junior Subordinate (7), Junior (6), 
Subordinate (5), None (4), Senior Subordinate (3), Senior (2), Senior Secure (1) 
RESTRICT A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the bond contains a company or 
subsidiary restrictive covenant or a bond protective covenant, zero otherwise 
 Control Variables/ Variables Unique to the Pricing Equation 
TDR The total debt ratio of the issuing company 
QR The quick liquidity ratio of the issuing company 
FINANCIAL A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the company issuing the bond was in 
the Finance industry, 0 otherwise 
UTILITY A dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the company issuing the bond was in 
the Utility industry, 0 otherwise 
MILLS-CB The inverse mills ratio for claw back bonds 
MILLS-MW The inverse mills ratio for make whole bonds 
MILLS-OC The inverse mills ratio for ordinary callable bonds 
MILLS-NC The inverse mills ratio for non callable bonds 
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Table 5: Selection Model for Callable and Non-callable bonds 
This table reports the variables that determine the popularity of non-callable and 
various types of callable bonds. All variables are defined in Table 4. 
 Claw Back  Make Whole Ordinary Callable Straight 
Variable Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
CONSTANT 2.102
* 
0.876 -2.686
***
 0.425 5.088
***
 0.400 -4.783
***
 0.363 
LEVEL -0.050 0.067 -0.605
***
 0.033 -0.370
***
 0.031 0.695
***
 0.027 
SLOPE    0.160
*
 0.073 -0.547
***
 0.037 -0.254
***
 0.037 0.538
***
 0.033 
VOLATILITY -0.014 0.011 -0.042
***
 0.005 -0.008 0.005 0.038
***
 0.005 
CREDIT SPREAD       0.103
***
 0.022 0.011 0.011 -0.074
***
 0.011 0.023
*
 0.010 
SHELF -0.297
*
 0.135 0.979
***
 0.066 0.195
**
 0.075 -0.864
***
 0.059 
BANK -0.486 0.384 -1.303
***
 0.115 0.440
***
 0.055 0.088 0.059 
COMPANY SIZE     -0.296
***
 0.031 -0.152
***
 0.013 0.099
***
 0.011 0.009 0.010 
AMOUNT 0.092
*
 0.045 0.272
***
 0.015 -0.195
***
 0.012 0.081
***
 0.011 
TERM NOTE      -1.371
***
 0.080 0.491
***
 0.088 1.090
***
 0.071 
COMPETITIVE -0.405 0.253 -0.717
***
 0.217 0.682
***
 0.167 0.158 0.184 
PRIVATE 0.587
***
 0.150 0.325
***
 0.075 -0.294
**
 0.096 -0.275
***
 0.070 
RATING -0.432
***
 0.017 0.138
***
 0.007 -0.018
**
 0.007 0.041
***
 0.006 
ROA      0.008 0.006 -0.010
*
 0.004 -0.031
***
 0.005 0.015
***
 0.004 
SECURITY    0.321
***
 0.081 0.354
***
 0.042 -0.479
***
 0.042 -0.102
**
 0.039 
RESTRICT 0.320
*
 0.136 0.396
***
 0.068 -0.338
***
 0.088 -0.157
*
 0.066 
DR      0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.007
***
 0.001 -0.010
***
 0.001 
QR       -0.007 0.019 -0.021
***
 0.007 0.094
***
 0.006 -0.566
***
 0.027 
N 10,028  10,028  10,028  10,028  
CASE CORRECT 9,661  8,523  8,962  8,079  
ON TYPE 979  3,025  2,816  3,028  
PSEUDO R
2 
0.573  0.550  0.536  0.353  
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01  
*** p < 0.001 
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Table 6 Pricing model for Callable and Non-callable bonds 
This table reports the variables that determine the offer spread for new issues of all 
types of bonds. The inverse mills ratios MILLSCB, MILLSMW, MILLSOC and MILLSNC 
report the difference in the offer spread for the claw back, make whole and ordinary 
callable bond and non-callable bonds respectively relative to all other types of bonds. 
All variables are defined in Table 4. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 6.836
***
 0.340 
SECURITY    -0.115
*
 0.046 
RESTRICT -0.380
***
 0.060 
RATING -0.356
***
 0.024 
SHELF -0.489
***
 0.053 
PRIVATE 0.315
***
 0.063 
COMPETITIVE -0.446
*
 0.176 
FINANCE 0.133
***
 0.033 
UTILITY -0.171
***
 0.035 
COMPANY SIZE     -0.073
***
 0.014 
TDR 0.007
***
 0.001 
QR       -0.066
*
 0.027 
ROA      -0.020
***
 0.004 
SLOPE    0.140
***
 0.016 
MILLSCB 0.302
***
 0.054 
MILLSMW -0.202
***
 0.032 
MILLSOC 0.197
***
 0.052 
MILLSNC 0.118
*
 0.049 
N 10028  
R2 0.576  
* p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01  
*** p < 0.001 
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Figure 1 The proportion of new issues of bonds by type relative to all types of bonds 
by year from 1995 to 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
